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COMMENTS
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN LOUISIANA
"A trust in which by the terms of the trust or by statute
a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer
of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed is a spendthrift
trust."'
The restriction of alienation of the income beneficiary's in-
terest in a trust has been recognized in Louisiana since the Trust
Estates Act was adopted in 1938.2 Although the original statute
did not allow restriction of alienation of the interest in prin-
cipal, it was amended in 1944 to allow such a restriction.3 In
1964 the Trust Estates Act was replaced by the Louisiana Trust
Code,4 which continues to recognize spendthrift trusts. There
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959). Although spendthrift
trusts have long been forbidden In England except on the interest of a
married woman, courts in the United States have generally allowed re-
striction of the income beneficiary's interest in the trust. The principal
case in the United States concerning the validity of spendthrift trusts is
N chols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875). In Nichols, although the facts did not
necessitate a discussion of spendthrift trusts, Justice Miller used the opinion
as a platform from which to espouse the view that spendthrift trusts are
valid. Although this was simply dictum, the Nichols case has been cited
numerous times in decisions upholding the validity of spendthrift trusts.
Professor Gray vehemently protested the validity of spendthrift trusts in
his Restraint on the Alienation of Property (2d ed. 1895), but the use of
the device has grown in the United States and today is accepted by most
states, either by statute or case law.
It appears that the only states Which prohibit spendthrift trusts are
New Hampshire, Ohio, and Rhode Island. See Epstein v. Corning, 91 N.H.
474, 22 A.2d 410 (1941); Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935);
Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963), noted in 24
OHIO ST. L.J. 567 (1963) and 33 U. CIN. L. Rsv. 281 (1964); Industrial Nat'l
Bank v. Budlong, 106 R.I. 780, 264 A.2d 18 (1970); In re Smyth, 49 R.I. 27,
139 A. 657 (1927); Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R.I. 205 (1858).
Although Miss. CODE ANN. § 849 (1942) provides that estates held in
trust are subject to the rights, debts and charges of the beneficiaries as
though they owned a like interest out of trust, the decisions seem to indi-
cate that spendthrift trusts are valid. See Stansel v. Hahn, 96 Miss. 616,
50 So. 696 (1909); Comment, 34 Miss. L.J. 333 (1963); Note, 13 Miss. L.J. 624
(1941). Formerly Alabama and Kentucky forbade spendthrift trusts, but
recent legislation in those states allows a restriction on alienation of in-
terests in trusts. See ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 1 (1958); Ky. REV. STAT. !§ 381.180
(1971). In the three states which do not allow spendthrift trusts, the trust
is valid, but the attempted restriction of alienation is invalid.
2. La. Acts 1938, No. 81. This statute followed the model proposed by
Professor Griswold in his treatise, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 565 (2d ed. 1947)
[hereinafter cited as GRiswoLD].
3. La. Acts 1944, No. 290, § 1.
4. LA. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited in the text by sec-
tion numbers which refer to the Louisiana Trust Code].
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are no cases in Louisiana concerning the constitutionality5 of
spendthrift trusts or the interpretation of spendthrift provisions
in the Trust Estates Act or the Trust Code. Although the stat-
ute is clear in most regards, some unanswered questions remain.
It is hoped that this article, by referring to the statute and to
common law authority from which Louisiana adopted the trust
device, will answer some of these questions.
The general rule in Louisiana is that a beneficiary may
transfer or encumber the whole or any part of his interest un-
less the trust instrument provides to the contrary., However,
the Trust Code provides that the interest of the beneficiary,
whether in income or principal, may be subject to a restraint
on the voluntary or involuntary alienation by the beneficiary.7
Restraining voluntary alienation means that the beneficiary can-
not transfer, assign, or encumber his interest in the trust, whereas
restraining involuntary alienation means that the creditors of
the beneficiary cannot reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust.
Words Sufficient to Create Spendthrift Trust
The Trust Code provides that "[a] declaration in a trust in-
5. Professor Pascal has argued that spendthrift trusts violate the Lou-
isiana Constitution (See art. IV, § 16): "By now the answer to the question
Just put must be obvious: a trust contains a prohibited substitution or fldei
commissum. only If the settlor's will directly or indirectly operates to con-
trol the transfer of the interest of the beneficiary to another; If the bene-
ficial interest is completely under the control of the beneficiary there is no
substitution or j'del commissum ...
"If this be true, as the writer believes, then extreme doubt Is cast on
the constitutional validity of spendthrift trusts, or terms imposed by the
settlor prohibiting the beneficiary from alienating his beneficial interest In
the trust by voluntary act." Pascal, The Trust Concept and Substituiton,
19 LA. L. REV. 273, 282 (1959).
No Louisiana case has dealt directly with the Issue of the constitution-
ality of spendthrift trusts. However, In Succession of Singlust, 169 So.2d 10
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), the court upheld a spendthrift trust over legitime,
thus intimating that spendthrift trusts in themselves are constitutional.
See also Succession of Heymann, 240 So.2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970),
where the court dealt with a spendthrift trust but did not consider its
constitutionality.
For a detailed study of the question of the validity of spendthrift trusts
see generally G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 222 (2d ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895); GRISWOLD §§ 25-33, 551-57; 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW O
TRUSTS § 152 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT]; Bushman, The
(In)validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 ORE. L. REV. 304 (1968); Costigan, Those
Protective Trusts Which Are MiscalZed "Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined,
22 CAL. L. REv. 471 (1934); Comment, 64 COLUm. L. Rv. 1323 (1964).
6. LA. R.S. 9:2001 (Supp. 1964).
7. Id. § 2002.
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strument that the interest of a beneficiary shall be held subject
to a 'spendthrift trust' is sufficient to restrain alienation by a
beneficiary of the interest to the maximum extent permitted by
this Sub-part." Furthermore, "spendthrift trust," when used
without other qualifying words, is defined as a "trust under which
alienation by a beneficiary of an interest in income or principal
is restricted to the full extent permitted by this Code." 9 It is
probable that most spendthrift trusts written by attorneys in the
state today follow the language in one of the forms found in the
Louisiana Trust Handbook." Therefore, if the settlor in the trust
instrument provides either that "[e]ach trust shall be held sub-
ject to the maximum restraint on voluntary or involuntary alien-
ation by the beneficiary permitted by the provisions of the Lou-
isiana Trust Code,"" or "[t]he interest of the Beneficiary shall
not be subject to voluntary or involuntary alienation,"'u it is ap-
parent that the settlor has created a spendthrift trust, and the
extent to which restriction of alienation was intended can be
easily determined. There may be times, however, when it is dif-
ficult to ascertain whether or not the settlor intended to create
a spendthrift trust and to what extent he intended to restrict
alienation.
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that although no
particular formula is required to create a spendthrift trust,18
the intention to establish a spendthrift trust must clearly appear
in the trust instrument.1 4 Although some of the early courts
allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the set-
8. Id. § 2007.
9. Id. § 1725(7).
10. J. RUBIN & A. RUBIN, LOUISIANA TRUST HANDBOOK (1968).
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 63.
13. De Lano's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); Tilton v.
Davidson, 98 Me. 55, 56 A. 215 (1903); Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497,
(1888); In re Moulton's Estate, 233 Minn. 286, 46 N.W.2d 667 (1951); Long
v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Cronquist v. Utah State Agr.
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949); See GRISWOLD § 264; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152, comment c. (1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
E)ENT]; SCOTr § 152.4.
14. Newell .v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); Eastman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 87 N.H. 189, 177 A. 414 (1935); Benefactor Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Latta, 106 Pa. Super. 156, 161 A. 757 (1932); Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d
235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 114 Utah
426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949); Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758, 293
N.W. 150 (1940). See GRSwoLD § 264; RESTATEMENT § 152, comment c; SCOTT
§ 152.4.
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tlor's intention, 15 most courts today do not allow evidence other
than the trust instrument itself. 6 Section 2001 of the Louisiana
Trust Code provides that the interest of the beneficiary is alien-
able "unless the trust instrument provides to the contrary." This
language indicates that the trust instrument must expressly pro-
vide for spendthrift provisions although it appears no particular
language is required.17 It is therefore evident that extrinsic evi-
dence of the settlor's intention will not be allowed.
Voluntary and Involuntary Alienation
The problem may arise whether the settlor of a spendthrift
trust intended to restrict voluntary alienation, involuntary alien-
ation, or both.' s In some trusts it has appeared that the settlor
intended the beneficiary's interest to be nonassignable, with-
out providing whether creditors could reach the interest. Courts
have generally interpreted these trusts to mean that the bene-
ficiary's interest could neither be assigned by him nor reached by
his creditors.19 The more frequent occurrence is that the trust
instrument forbids creditors from reaching the beneficiary's in-
terest, while not mentioning whether the beneficiary will have
the power to alienate. Again, the courts have generally held
that the trust is restricted as to both voluntary and involuntary
alienation. 20
The most difficult problem arises when the settlor clearly
intends a restriction of only voluntary or involuntary alienation,
15. Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N.E. 339 (1905) (dictum); Stam
baugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 358, 19 A. 1058 (1890); Patten v. Herring, 9 Tex.
Civ. App. 640, 29 S.W. 388 (1895).
16. Evidence that beneficiary is a spendthrift not admitted: Standard
Chem. Co. v. Weed, 226 Iowa 882, 285 N.W. 175 (1939); L'Hommedieu v.
L'Hommedieu, 98 N.J. Eq. 554, 131 A. 302 (1925). Evidence concerning sur-
rounding circumstances not admitted: Standard Chem. Co. v. Weed, 226
Iowa 882, 285 N.W. 175 (1939); Shoup's Estate, 31 Pa. Super. 162 (1906). See
GRISWOLD § 270; RESTATEMENT § 152, comment f.
17. "In the absence of express provision in the instrument, the bene-
ficiary is free to encumber his interest." (Emphasis added.) J. RUBIN &
A. RUBIN, LOUISIANA TRUST HANDBOOK 276 (1968).
18. See BOGERT § 222; GRISWOLD § 265; ScoTT § 152.3.
19. See Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247 (1884); Jackson Square Loan &
Savings Ass'n v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 53 A. 426 (1902); Partridge v. Caven-
der, 96 Mo. 452, 9 S.W. 785 (1888); Winthrop Co. v. Clinton, 196 Pa. 472, 46
A. 435 (1900); White v. O'Bryan, 148 Tenn. 13, 251 S.W. 785 (1923); RESTATE-
MENT § 152, comment e.
20. Hopkinson v. Swaim, 284 I1. 11, 119 N.E. 985 (1918); Barker's Estate,




but not both. The first example of the problem is a situation
in which the settlor provides that the creditors will have the
right to seize the interest of the beneficiary, but that the bene-
ficiary will have no right to assign his interest. It is submitted
that this type restriction is infrequently used because the settlor
generally believes more protection is afforded by restraining
the creditors. The second example is that the beneficiary will
have the right to assign his interest, but creditors are expressly
prevented from seizing that interest. Although it has been
argued that this type restriction should be invalid as against
"public policy,"2' 1 a few courts have sanctioned it. 22
Section 2002 of the Trust Code states that "the trust instru-
ment may provide that the interest of a beneficiary shall not be
subject to voluntary or involuntary alienation by a beneficiary."
(Emphasis added.) The way in which the word "or" is used
indicates that it is to be read conjunctively rather than disjunc-
tively. That is, in order to have a spendthrift trust, both volun-
tary and involuntary alienation must be restricted. This conclu-
sion is strengthened by the fact that section 1725 (7) clearly
states that in order for a spendthrift trust to exist, the bene-
ficiary's interest must be subject to the maximum restriction on
alienation permitted by the Code, i.e., restrictions on both vol-
untary and involuntary alienation. Therefore, it appears that
only those trusts in which both restrictions upon alienation are
present should be sanctioned as spendthrift trusts.
The comments to section 2002 state, however, that a trust
instrument may restrict alienation to a lesser degree than that
permitted by the Code, although the trust will not be considered
21. "It would seem that it is against public policy to prevent the bene-
ficiary's creditors from reaching property which he can dispose of volun-
tarily." SCOTT § 152.3 at 1153. Professor Bogert, however, takes the opposite
view: "If a trustor [settlor] expressly states that his beneficiary is to be
subject to a restraint as to voluntary alienation, but makes no mention of
a restraint as to creditors; or if he excludes the rights of creditors but
does not express any intent with regard to assignments by the beneficiary,
it would seem that the single restraint should be valid. There is no require-
ment that the restraint must affect both alienees and creditors. The power
to create two types of restraints includes ability to place a single class of
restraint on the beneficiary." BOCERT § 222, at 645-46.
22. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Luke, 220 Mass. 484, 108 N.E. 64
(1915); Ames v. Clarke, 106 Mass. 573 (1871); See Huntress v. Allen, 195
Mass. 226, 80 N.E. 949 (1907); Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 209, 179 A. 186
(1935); Holmesburg Bldg. Ass'n v. Badger, 144 Pa. Super 65, 18 A.2d 529
(1941). But see Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So.
243 (1911). See generally Note, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 480 (1933).
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a spendthrift trust. There are no provisions of the Trust Code
which forbid the creation of this "quasi-spendthrift trust" by
placing restraints on voluntary alienation without placing re-
straints on involuntary alienation. 28 The converse is not true,
however, because section 2004(1) provides that a creditor may
seize an interest in income or principal that is subject to volun-
tary alienation by a beneficiary. This provision apparently means
that voluntary alienation must be restricted to the same extent
as involuntary alienation in order for spendthrift or quasi-spend-
thrift provisions to be effective. It is submitted that this is a
wise policy decision, preventing the beneficiary from having the
best of two worlds. Otherwise, the beneficiary would have full
use of his interest in the trust, while creditors would be pre-
vented from reaching that interest to receive payment for the
debts owed by the beneficiary.
Income and Principal Interest
Louisiana, along with the majority of other states, 24 allows
restriction of both income and principal interests.25 Can either
of these interests in the trust be restricted without restriction
of the other? The Trust Code defines a spendthrift trust as one
in which voluntary and involuntary alienation of the income
or principal beneficiary's interest in the trust is restricted.2
Using the disjunctive-conjunctive analysis here, the word "or"
between the words "income" and "principal" appears to be dis-
junctive; it therefore follows that the settlor may restrict either
23. "The trust instrument may restrict alienation to a lesser degree than
permitted by this Code, but a trust existing under such an instrument is
not a 'spendthrift trust.'" LA. R.S. 9:2002 (Supp. 1964). The writer uses
the term "quasi-spendthrift" trust in discussing these lesser restrictions
because the term implies something less than a spendthrift trust.
24. See, e.g., San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App.
675, 10 P.2d 158 (1932); Hopkinson v. Swaim, 284 Ill. 11, 119 N.E. 985 (1918);
Hitchens v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 193 Md. 53, 66 A.2d 93 (1949); Buck-
nam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E. 918 (1936); In re Vought, 25 N.Y.2d
163, 250 N.E.2d 912 (1969); Town of Shrewsbury v. Bucklin, 105 Vt. 188, 163
A. 626 (1933). See RESTATEMENT § 153.
25. "This Code makes no distinction between the enforceability of a re-
straint upon alienation of an interest in income and the enforceability of a
restraint upon alienation of an interest in principal. It considers a 'spend-
thrift trust' to be one under which voluntary alienation and involuntary
alienation by a beneficiary of an interest in income or principal are re-
stricted to the full extent permitted." LA. R.S. 9:2001, comment b (Supp.
1964).
26. Id. § 1725(7).
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the interest of the income beneficiary, the principal beneficiary,
or both.7
However, even assuming that a valid spendthrift trust must
restrict the alienation of the interest of both the income and
principal beneficiary, a trust which restricts the alienation of
either will be valid, although not as a spendthrift trust.2 This
is true because the Trust Code sanctions lesser restrictions.
Therefore, if the clear intention of the settlor in the trust in-
strument is to restrain the interest of either the income or the
principal beneficiary, but not both, the non-restricted interest
could be both assigned by the beneficiary and reached by his
creditors.2 ' Furthermore, where there are several beneficiaries,
either to income or principal or both, it appears that the settlor
may validly restrict the alienation of the interests of certain
beneficiaries without restricting the alienation of the interests
of others.3 I
When there is no restriction upon alienation of the principal
beneficiary's interest, the assignee or the creditor may gain an
interest in the trust principal, but he may not reach the trust
property itself until the trust terminates. Similarly, if there is
no restraint upon the income beneficiary's interest, the assignee
or creditor obtains only that interest, with the right to receive
the income when it is paid out by the trustee.81 Where there are
various income and principal beneficiaries, the seizure or assign-
27. Griswold and Scott argue against the validity of spendthrift provi-
sions to principal where principal is restrained until the death of the bene-
ficiary. GRiswoLD § 106 at 103: "Restraining the alienation of the right to
receive the principal should not be allowed. This is especially true when
the right to receive the principal is not to be enjoyed until the death of the
beneficiary; in such a case the restraint is in no way necessary to protect
the personal enjoyment of the beneficiary." SCOTT § 153, at 1172: "Even
though a restraint on the alienation of a beneficiary's right to receive prin-
cipal is valid, yet if the principal is not payable to him but to his estate
on his death, the restriction should not be valid. In such a case the re-
straint would be of no advantage to the beneficiary himself, and would
merely give him a right to dispose of the property on his death, free from
the claims of his creditors. It has been held, at any rate, that on his death
his creditors can reach his interest."
28. LA. R.S. 9:2001 (Supp. 1964).
29. The same result is also reached in other jurisdictions. See Perabo
v. Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922); In re Hall's Estate, 248 Pa.
218, 93 A. 944 (1915); SCOTT § 153.
30. See note 29 supra.
31. RESTATEMENT § 147. Furthermore, when the income is in the hands
of the trustee, but has not been paid over to the beneficiary, it is generally
held that alienation is still restricted. GsswoLD §§ 306, 369-70; RESTATEMENT
§ 152, comment h; SCOTT § 152.5.
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ment of the interest of one beneficiary should not affect the in-
terest of the other beneficiaries. In like manner, where one indi-
vidual is the beneficiary of both income and principal, although
both interests will probably be seized or assigned at the same
time, the seizure or assignment of one interest should not affect
the other.
Effect of Death of Income or Principal Beneficiary on Spend-
Thrift Provisions
It is clear that since the income beneficiary's interest in the
trust necessarily ends at his death, 2 no trust interest passes to
his heirs or legatees. However, any accumulated or undistributed
income is paid to the heirs, legatees, assignees, or legal repre-
sentative of the beneficiary.33 In this case creditors may attach
the income to pay the debts of the beneficiary.3 4
The effect of the spendthrift provisions upon the rights of
the heirs or legatees in whom the principal beneficiary's interest
vests at his death, and creditors of the estate, is unclear. The
Trust Code provides that upon a principal beneficiary's death,
"his interest vests in his heirs or legatees, subject to the trust
.... "35 This wording indicates that the spendthrift provisions
apply also to heirs and legatees; and it can be argued that this
is true because the heirs and legatees should take no greater
right than that held by their ancestor. An opposite view, how-
ever, is that the spendthrift provisions end upon the death of the
principal beneficiary absent a contrary intention of the settlor,86
because the purpose of the spendthrift provisions is to protect
32. LA. R.S. 9:1964 (Supp. 1964): "An interest In income terminates upon
the death of the designated beneficiary, or at the expiration of the period
of his enjoyment if the interest is for a period less than life. At the
termination of an income interest, accumulated or undistributed income
shall be paid to the beneficiary or his heirs, legatees, assignees, or legal
representatives, except as otherwise provided in this Code."
33. Id.
34. See RESTATEMENT § 152, comment j; ScoTT § 158.1.
35. LA. R.S. 9:1972 (Supp. 1964).
36. J. RUBIN & A. RUBIN, LOUISIANA TRUST HANDBOOK 15 (1968): "The
Louisiana Trust Code states that the heir of a beneficiary takes 'subject
to the trust' (Art. 1972). Query: Are heirs who inherit from the beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust before the termination of the trust restricted to the
same extent as was the original beneficiary? In the phrasings suggested
for the relevant trusts in this volume, the 'trust' or the 'beneficiary' is sub-
ject to 'maximum restraints,' and the restraints could be urged to extend
for the term of the trust itself regardless of the individual who benefits."
[Vol. 33
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only the named beneficiary during his lifetime. 7 This result is
reinforced by the argument that, since the beneficiary is given
the authority by section 1972 to transfer his principal interest
in the trust to his "legatees," then his interest is necessarily
alienable because he can divest himself of it through his will. If
this is so, then the interest should pass to heirs or legatees free
from spendthrift restraints.88
If spendthrift restraints upon the principal interest do not
continue after the death of the principal beneficiary, although
the trust is still in effect, is this interest in the trust subject to
the rights of the creditors above the rights of heirs or legatees?
Courts elsewhere have uniformly held that the creditors of the
beneficiary prevail over his legatees or his heirs.8 9 They have
argued that after the beneficiary's death, all his property should
be subject to the claims of his creditors. His heirs or legatees
should not be allowed to take that interest free of their claims.
Louisiana would evidently reach the same result under its suc-
cession law.40
If the statute is interpreted so that the heirs and legatees of
the principal beneficiary take subject to the spendthrift provi-
sions, it appears that creditors will have no opportunity to reach
the deceased's interest in the trust. If this is the proper inter-
pretation of the statute, the result is unfortunate and could be
avoided. The statute could be amended to provide that spend-
thrift provisions end at the death of the principal beneficiary
absent a contrary intention by the settlor, and if spendthrift
provisions continue, the principal interest in the trust is liable
37. GRiswoLD § 93; Sco'r § 158.1, at 1234: "There would seem to be no
reason, therefore, why on his death his creditors should not be able to reach
his interest under the trust if his interest has not ceased on his death.
If the principal of the trust fund is payable to the estate of the beneficiary
on his death, his creditors can reach it. The policy underlying the decisions
upholding spendthrift trusts does not require that a beneficiary should be
permitted to dispose of his interest on his death without discharging his
debts. If his assets other than his interest under the trust are insufficient
to pay his creditors, he should not be permitted to bequeath his interest
free from the claims of his creditors, and if he dies intestate it should not
pass to his next of kin unless his debts are paid ....
38. "If devisees and legatees are to take at all the Interest must be
alienable; and if the interest is alienable it should be treated just as other
alienable property and held liable for the debts of its owner." GRISWoLD §
93, at 89.
39. Id.
40. See LA. Crv. CoDE arts. 976-1013, 1032-74, 1415-43.
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for debts of the beneficiary before it passes to the heirs or lega-
tees.
41
Contracts to Pay Over Income When Received
It is possible that the income beneficiary, rather than as-
signing his interest, may contract at any time during the trust
to pay over the income to someone else when it is received by
the beneficiary. 42 This type of alienation should be valid in spite
of spendthrift provisions because it is not an assignment of an
interest in the trust but is merely a contract giving the promisee
a personal right against the beneficiary.43 Although this result
is supported by several decisions from other jurisdictions,4 4 the
Trust Code contains no provisions directly on point. In keeping
with the theory of freedom of contract, Louisiana should allow
the income beneficiary to contract with an individual to pay to
him income when it is received.
If the beneficiary does assign his interest, even though this
is a violation of the spendhrift provisions, cases in other juris-
dictions have held that it is not a breach of the trust for the
trustee to pay the income to the assignee as the income "falls
due. '45 The trustee, of course, is under no duty to make such
payments. If the beneficiary revokes the assignment, the assignee
may be able to sue the beneficiary for breach of contract.4
41. In this regard it should be noted that creditors will be protected
where the interest passes to an heir, universal legatee, or legatee under
universal title who unconditionally accepts the succession because he will
be personally liable for the debts of the decedent. See LA. Civ. CODE arts.
1013, 1424, 1426, 1430.
42. See GRISWOLD §§ 372-75; ScoTT § 152.6.
43. "The contract in such a case is not an assignment. It gives to the
promisee of the beneficiary simply a personal right. The creator of a trust
cannot deprive his beneficiary of capacity to contract, and if a contract is
made by the beneficiary, it should be enforced. The intent of the creator
of the trust is sufficiently recognized by the holding that the promisee may
not reach the future income of the beneficiary." GRISWOLD § 372, at 456.
44. Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Cal. 2d 356, 79 P.2d 1059 (1938); Bursch v. Bursch,
60 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1930); Bostrom v. Bostrom, 60 N.D. 792, 236 N.W. 732 (1931).
But see Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1014, 22 S.W.2d 813
(1929). See generally GlUsWOLD § 373; ScoTT § 152.6.
45. See, e.g., In re Marble, 136 Me. 52, 1 A.2d 355 (1938); Ames v. Clarke,
106 Mass. 573 (1871); In re Goldman, 142 Misc. 790, 255 N.Y. Supp. 533
(1932); In re Keeler's Estate, 344 Pa. 225, 3 A.2d 413 (1939); GiswoLD § 306;
RESTATEMENT § 152. There are no Louisiana cases.




The idea of spendthrift trusts has long been criticized be-
cause the device enables a beneficiary to escape his creditors.
47
Although there appear to be few instances in which Louisiana
creditors have tried to reach the interest of the beneficiary in
spendthrift trusts,48 the Louisiana statute has attempted to quiet
critics by allowing the beneficiary's interest to be reached in
certain situations.
Of course, the creditor can seize any trust interest which is
subject to voluntary alienation.4 9 Also, section 2004(2) provides
that "[t]he portion of the net annual income in excess of the
amount that will give a beneficiary an aggregate net annual
income of $10,000 from all spendthrift trusts and from all other
trusts under which alienation by a beneficiary is restricted" may
be seized by creditors. If "net annual income" means only in-
come paid to the beneficiary, it appears that if the trustee is
given discretion to accumulate or distribute income under section
1963, then he may avoid seizure by creditors by distributing
only $10,000 per year to the beneficiary, and accumulating the
remainder. On the other hand if the statute is referring to
accrued income, then whether the trustee can accumulate may
make no difference as far as protection from seizure is con-
cerned.50 Similarly, if the trustee can allocate income to princi-
pal,5' it appears that income could be limited to $10,000 per year,
again allowing escape from seizure.
Where the settlor is himself a beneficiary, section 2004(3)
follows both the majority rule5 2 and the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts58 in providing that the creditor of the beneficiary may
47. J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895).
48. There are no cases. From discussions with trust officers of Louisiana
banks it appears that creditors rarely try to reach the beneficiary's interest
in the trust. It may be, however, that creditors do not attempt to seize
interests in trusts because of the realization that the spendthrift provisions,
which are placed upon the majority of trusts in Louisiana, prevent seizure
by the creditors except in certain situations. It may also be that most
beneficiaries generally have other assets which creditors can reach more
readily.
49. LA. R.S. 9:2004(1) (Supp. 1964).
50. But see note 31 supra.
51. LA. R.S. 9:1961 (Supp. 1964). The trustee can do this only under an
objective standard set forth in the trust instrument, and then only when
the interests of other beneficiaries are not thereby Impaired.
52. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.121-25 (1952); GRISWOLD §§ 471-
98; SCOTT § 156.
53. RESTATEMENT § 156.
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seize the interest of any beneficiary who is also a settlor of the
trust. This, of course, is to prevent a man from escaping his own
creditors by placing his assets in spendthrift trusts.
Louisiana also allows seizure by certain classes of creditors.54
Section 2005 provides that regardless of the trust provisions,
the proper court at its discretion, may permit the seizure of any
just portion of the beneficiary's interest in trust income and
principal if the claim is based upon (1) a judgment for alimony
or maintenance of a person whom the beneficiary is obligated to
support,55 (2) necessary services rendered or necessary supplies
furnished to the beneficiary or to a person whom the beneficiary
is obligated to support,5 or (3) an offense or quasi-offense com-
mitted by the beneficiary or by a person for whose acts the bene-
ficiary is individually responsible.57
Although our law contains no such provision, other states
allow seizure by the creditor who has performed a service which
results in increasing or preserving the value of the beneficiary's
interest in the trust estate.58 The usual rationale has been that
the purpose of the settlor in imposing restraints was to prevent
54. For a discussion of this area in other jurisdictions see BOGERT § 224;
GRISWOLD §§ 333-61; RESTATEMENT § 157; SCOTT §§ 157-57.5.
55. A person is obligated to support his spouse, his children, and those
of his ascendants and descendants who are in need. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 119,
227, 229. For a discussion of this exception in other jurisdictions see 6
AMERICAN LAW PROPERTY § 26.130 (1952); BOGERT § 224; GRIswoLD §§ 333-41;
RESTATEMENT § 157; SCOTT § 157.1.
56. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 119, 227, 229, 1785. See also BOGERT § 224;
GRISWOLD §§ 347, 364; RESTATEMENT § 157; SCOTT § 157.2.
57. The Restatement did not adopt this view because of the lack of
authority in the area. It appears, however, that Louisiana made a wise
policy decision when it allowed those who have been injured by another to
reach his interest in the trust. Part of the reasoning behind restricting
involuntary alienation is that creditors should investigate those persons to
whom they grant credit. Certainly the injured party is not in the position
to investigate and, as a policy matter, should be allowed to recover for his
Injuries from the beneficiary's interest in the trust. See LA. CIV. CODE arts.
2315, 2318; GRISWOLD § 365; SCOTT § 157.5.
58. See In re Williams, 187 N.Y. 286, 79 N.E. 1019 (1907) (attorney was
allowed a lien upon the interest of the beneficiaries who hired him to
compel the trustee to pay); Fetting v. Flanigan, 185 Md. 499, 45 A.2d 355
(1946) (trustee who paid taxes on the trust estate was entitled to indem-
nification from the estate); Keaton v. Stephenson, 206 Okla. 32, 240 P.2d
1088 (1952) (dictum that attorney could reach the beneficiary's interest in
a spendthrift trust). But see McKeown v. Pridmore, 310 Il. App. 634, 35
N.E.2d 376 (1941) (when trustee of a spendthrift trust refused to pay bene-
ficiary under the trust, court held attorney hired on contingent fee basis
by beneficiary had no lien on spendthrift trust but had to stand as any other
creditor); In re Lee's Estate, 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W.2d 245 (1943); See gen-
erally GRISWOLD §§ 345, 366; RESTATEMENT § 157; SCOTT § 157.3.
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the beneficiary from losing his interest through his own poor
management. Therefore, a person who has conferred a benefit
upon the interest of the beneficiary should be allowed to re-
ceive compensation from the beneficiary through his interest
in the trust.
The Restatement provides that "[a]lthough a trust is a
spendthrift trust.., the interest of the beneficiary can be reached
in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary...
by the United States or a State to satisfy a claim against the
beneficiary."59 Accordingly, seizure of interests in spendthrift
trusts has been allowed for tax claims6 and for support of the
beneficiary in a public institution,6 1 but not for payment of a
fine owed to the government, 2 nor for money due the govern-
ment under a contract6 8 Although the Trust Code contains no
provisions allowing the federal government to seize the interest
of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust in satisfaction of the obliga-
tions owed to it, the Internal Revenue Code provides that if any
person neglects or refuses to pay any tax for which he is liable,
the amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon
all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.m6 4 In light of federal cases in this area, 5
it is submitted that the lien extends to the interest of the bene-
ficiary of a Louisiana spendthrift trust, regardless of the absence
of an applicable Louisiana statute.
59. RESTATEMENT § 157(d).
60. Leuschner v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1958); United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1945); United
States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 62 F. Supp. 837 (ID. Md. 1945); In re Rosen-
berg's Will, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.E. 206 (1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
See GRISWOLD §§ 342, 845; ScoTT § 157.4.
61. Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935); Constanza v. Verona,
48 N.J. Super. 355, 137 A.2d 614 (1958); In re Bins Will, 48 Misc. 2d 921, 266
N.Y.S.2d 235 (1966); In re Walters, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A. 408 (1924). See ScoTw
§§ 157.2, 157.4.
62. McElhany v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 286 (1944).
63. State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W.2d 624 (1944).
64. INT. REv. CoDs of 1954, § 6321.
65. United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1945):
"Although the testatrix intended to create an estate which would not be
subject to seizure, sale, or execution for debts of any kind or character by
placing such restraint upon the corpus and income, and such provisions in
a will are valid under Texas law and are respected by the courts, this
would not prevail against the fastening of a lien by the Federal Govern-
ment for unpaid taxes on any property owned by the delinquent taxpayer."
(Footnote omitted.) United States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 62 F. Supp. 837(D. Md. 1945) (income payable to the beneficiary under Maryland spend-
thrift trust was subject to claims of federal government for income taxes
due from the beneficiary while income was still in the hands of the trustee).
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Term of a Spendthrift Trust
The question remains whether Louisiana will allow spend-
thrift provisions for a period less than the life of the interest. An
example of this situation is making B the income and principal
beneficiary of a trust for his life with spendthrift provisions to
be effective until he reaches age 21. The Trust Code provides
that in order for a spendthrift trust to be valid, the trust must
be subject to the maximum restraints permitted by the Code.6
Although the Code does not specify the term for which spend-
thrift provisions is allowed, it seems that only spendthrift pro-
visions that apply for the duration of a beneficiary's interest
would constitute maximum restraints.
However, since our Code recognizes lesser restrictions,7 it
appears that the settlor can create a trust with provision for the
restriction on alienation to last for a period of time less than the
term of the beneficiary's interest. This is a desirable result both
from the standpoint of the settlor who wishes to place restric-
tions only until he feels the beneficiary is able to deal with his
own interests wisely, and from that of the beneficiary who would
like eventually to have full control of his interest. However, since
it is not certain that the beneficiary will be competent to handle
his affairs at the age when spendthrift provisions are to ter-
minate, perhaps the settlor should use a more flexible form of
lesser restriction.
Spendthrift Trusts Over Legitime
The Trust Estates Act of 193868 allowed the legitime to be
placed in trust, but contained no provisions concerning restric-
tions placed on the right to alienate that legitime. The Trust
Code not only allows the legitime to be placed in trust,69 but
66. LA. R.S. 9:1725(7) (Supp. 1964).
67. Id. § 2002.
68. La. Acts 1938, No. 81.
69. LA. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1964): "The legitime or any portion thereof
may be placed in trust provided:
"(1) The net income accruing to the forced heir therefrom is
payable to him not less than once each year; and
"(2) The forced heir's interest is subject to no charges or con-
ditions except as provided in R.S. 9:1843 and 9:1844; and
"(3) The term of the trust, as it affects the legitime, does not
exceed the life of the forced heir; and
"(4) The principal shall be delivered to the forced heir or his
heirs, legatees, or assignees free of trust, upon the termination of
the portion of the trust that affects the legitime."
Id. § 1843: "A trust instrument may place restraints upon the alienation
of the legitime in trust."
[Vol. 33
COMMENTS
also allows that trust to be subject to spendthrift provisions.70
This means that if the trust is for the life of the beneficiary and
the spendthrift provisions are the maximum permitted by the
Code, the forced heir will have no control whatsoever over his
legitime for his lifetime.
The constitutionality of this provision was upheld by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Succession of Singlust.71
In that case the testatrix had created a testamentary spendthrift
trust over the legitime of her only son for his lifetime. The court,
relying upon the earlier case of Succession of Earhart,72 found
that the Louisiana constitution 8 prohibits only the passing of
a law abolishing forced heirship and does not prevent the rights
of forced heirs from being regulated or restricted.
It can be argued that because a forced heir is entitled to his
legitime of right, the legislature should not allow such a restric-
tion. 4 However, as Professor Oppenheim has stated:
"The settlor may choose not to use the spendthrift pro-
visions; but if the forced heir needs their protection, the
settlor has the means of providing that protection. The
trustee can be given the discretion to advance the capital
in a proper case. This is an area in which no general rule
should be specified by the legislature. The settlor himself
should have the choice to use the provisions or not, as family
circumstances require."7 5
70. Id. § 1843.
71. 169 So.2d 10 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
72. 220 La. 817, 57 So.2d 695 (1952).
73. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
74. Professor Pascal's argument, although applied only to a trust over
legitime and not to a spendthrift trust, appears pertinent: "If an inde-
structible trust is morally wrong because it denies the beneficiary whoso-
ever he be his natural right as a person to administer his own affairs, then
it is even more wrong morally to permit an indestructible trust over the
legitime, or forced share of an Inheritance, to be Indestructible. The legi-
time has its origin in the recognition of every man's right to share in the
world's goods which he can use as he judges best. It is especially repre-
hensible to permit this share to be unalterably under the control of another
.... The new Trust Estates Law need not forbid the placing of the legi-
time in trust; but under no circumstances should it permit the trust over
the legitime to be indestructable or unmodiflable by the forced heir." Pas-
cal, Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes, 23 LA L. REV. 639,
649 (1963).




In the light of this argument, and since the net income from the
legitime in trust must be distributed to the beneficiary at least
annually, 0 it is submitted that allowing restrictions on legitime
in trust is reasonable. However, the settlor should not indis-
criminately place maximum spendthrift provisions on the legi-
time in trust but should use such lesser restrictions as the situa-
tion may require.
Limiting Spendthrift Provisions
Besides the use of "quasi-spendthrift trusts" or other lesser
restrictions already mentioned, there are other ways in which
spendthrift provisions may be limited. These limitations are
desirable in order that the competent beneficiary may reach his
interest for some worthwhile purpose. Thus, with proper pro-
visions in the trust, the trustee could end the trust at his discre-
tion or in accordance with instructions set forth in the trust in-
strument, and turn the trust property over to the beneficiary for
his own use.78 Therefore, the property while in trust would be
safely protected from creditors and accessible for use by the
beneficiary. Also, the settlor of an inter vivos trust has the right
to personally modify the trust, and thus terminate spendthrift
provisions, if he has expressly reserved that right.79 Further, it
appears that the trustee may be given the power to end spend-
thrift provisions, either at his discretion or by a standard set
forth in the trust instrument. This is so because the settlor may
delegate to another person the right to modify the administrative
provisions of a trust." It may be argued that because terminating
spendthrift provisions changes the nature of the trust, this power
is not administrative and cannot be delegated. However, since the
76. LA. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1964).
77. Suppose, for example, that B has the opportunity to participate in
a business venture which is reasonably certain to be successful. B has no
available capital, but he is the beneficiary of a large interest in a spend-
thrift trust. Although his participation in the venture appears to be a rea-
sonable business decision, he cannot reach his interest in the spendthrift
trust to obtain necessary funds if the maximum restraints are placed on the
trust.
78. LA. R.S. 9:2025 (Supp. 1964).
79. Id. § 2021.
80. Id. § 2025.
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trustee can be given the greater power to terminate the trust,
then the lesser power of modification by ending spendthrift pro-
visions should also be included.
Another possibility in limiting the restriction of alienation
is to grant the trustee power either to lend trust money or to give
trust property to the beneficiary. Although such property would
no longer be protected by spendthrift provisions, this result
would obviously not violate the restrictions placed upon aliena-
tion if the settlor intended that the trustee would have such dis-
cretion. Finally, a beneficiary who is restricted by spendthrift
provisions and who wishes to reach his interest in the trust may
petition the proper court to have the trust terminated or modified
"if, owing to circumstances not known to a settlor and not antici-
pated by him, the continuance of the trust unchanged would
defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the trust."81
Conclusion
Although this article has discussed several questions which
arise concerning spendthrift trusts, the problems of trusts for
support, 2 discretionary trusts, 3 and forfeiture for alienation, 4
among others, remain untreated. It is suggested that the prac-
ticing bar consider the consequences and available alternatives
before suggesting that maximum restrictions be placed indis-
criminately on the beneficiary's interest in the trust. The use of
lesser restrictions or limitations may provide the balance neces-
sary, both to fulfill the desire of the settlor to protect the bene-
ficiary, and to allow the competent beneficiary to have some
control over his interest in the trust.
Craig Henry
81. Id. § 2026.
82. See generally BOGERT §§ 221, 229; GRISWOLD §§ 271, 430-34.2; RSTATm-
MDNT § 154; SCOTr § 154.
83. See generally BOGzRT § 228; GRISWOLD §§ 271, 422-29; RESTATEiMNT §
155; SCOTT §§ 128.3, 155.
84. See generally BOGORT § 222; RIoSTATEMENT § 150; SCOTT § 150.
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